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What can be said about terrorism’s strategic impact? Under what circum-
stances does it succeed or fail? Has it ever been a “driver” of historical change?
These are just a few of the questions raised by the cases in this special issue of
the journal. Nevertheless, they are daunting ones for the historian. Before
answering them, therefore, it is essential to consider how the historian must
apply the “tools of the trade” to this intractable problem.
Terrorism and the Historian
The challenges that face the historian attempting to assess the historical
significance of terrorism vary considerably, depending on whether the focus of
the study is terrorism as a whole or a specific case study, as in this issue’s arti-
cles. Some of these issues, such as the problem of defining terrorism, have been
discussed, in part, by Bruce Hoffman earlier in the issue.1
If the focus is a single case study, then the primary challenge confronting
the historian is the breadth of knowledge required to have a full understanding of
the case. Indeed, the historian will have to draw upon skills and knowledge from
a variety of academic disciplines, not simply those of history. Stuart Farson, for
example, has identified a long list of knowledge issues that would be required to
fully appreciate the complexities of the Khalistan Movement’s attempt to estab-
lish a Sikh homeland in the Punjab. In his view, to understand this movement,
one would need to know about:
Sikhism, Islam, and Hinduism; the history of the sub-continent; the
socio-cultural, ethnic, religious-linguistic construction of the region;
its economic geography; the politics of modern India, especially fed-
eral-state relations; the structure, policies, training, recruitment, and
management systems of Indian policing; the nature of political vio-
lence in India and especially within the Punjab; India’s international
relations, especially with Pakistan, the US and China; and the nature,
strategies and tactics employed in the “proxy war” between Pakistan
and India; the equipment, tactics, cultures and strategies employed
by India’s and Pakistan’s military; the structure, functions and activ-
ities of the Indian and Pakistani intelligence services, especially their
use of disinformation, misinformation and propaganda; and the prac-
tices of the Indian and Pakistani governments, and of Sikh political
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and insurgent groups at home and abroad, in distorting and misrep-
resenting facts related to insurgencies in the Punjab and other areas. 
He continues:
To these must be added: an understanding of the likely political and
psychological outcome of genocide and other forms of mass murder;
public expectations regarding civil liberties and human rights in
India and what constitutes appropriate/inappropriate action; broad
understanding of insurgency, terrorist, and separatist politics and
counter-terrorist approaches; and last — but certainly not least —
knowledge of the Punjabi language.2
Obviously, this list is specific to one case but the broader point is that the
historian of a terrorist group or campaign needs to have expertise not only in his-
tory but also in the domestic and international politics of the region and a range
of socio-cultural, economic, and linguistic factors. Moreover, this expertise
needs to extend not only to a specific group, but to the national and internation-
al counterterrorism forces that may be arrayed against such an organization.
Finally, the historian needs to be able to place the specific case in the wider con-
text, not only of the region, but also of terrorism and counterterrorism more
broadly. The historian will have to rely not only on their own disciplinary skills,
but will have to beg, borrow or steal tools, methods, and insights from other dis-
ciplines — psychology, sociology, political science, and international studies.
History is inherently inter-disciplinary and the good historian must be a good
poacher.3
While such analysis is likely to encompass some objective facts, it will also
include subjective realities or narratives. History can be, and is, used for the pur-
poses of political mobilization by both governments and terrorists and by jour-
nalists and other observers to support particular lines of argument. The misuse or
misunderstanding of history is an aspect of terrorism throughout time but specif-
ic historical narratives do not require deliberate manipulation to be effective for
mobilization or justification of specific courses of action. They are constructed
and the historian is ineluctably a part of this process. As an example, in the wake
of the August 2006 plot to destroy multiple airliners over the Atlantic, several
prominent Muslim leaders in Britain identified a link between increased Islamic
radicalization in Britain and the country’s foreign policy, especially in the Middle
East, of supporting the ‘oppression’ of Muslims. This assessment and overt link-
age between terrorism and foreign policy was categorically rejected by the Blair
government and by much of the mainstream British media, not only on norma-
tive grounds (even if opposition to government policy was a factor in radicaliza-
tion, it could never justify the resort to terrorism), but also on factual ones. This
latter point was best made by an editorial in the 13 August edition of The
Observer, which argued that Muslim terrorism against United States long pre-
dated the War on Terror and that much Western foreign policy in the 1990s had
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been dedicated to protecting Muslims from aggression, as in Bosnia or Kosovo,
rather than perpetrating such attacks. The editorial ended by denouncing “bogus
accounts of victimization.”4 This conveniently ignores the intrinsic subjectivity
of such narratives and is historically selective since it also ignores the Muslim
perception that ongoing Western support for Israel against the Palestinians and
Israel’s Arab neighbors, along with the presence of Western troops on the Saudi
peninsula, dating back to the early 1990s, can be seen by Muslims as ‘oppres-
sion.’ Whichever version of Western foreign policy is objectively more accurate,
the narrative of victimization has considerable currency and carries significant
weight as a radicalizing force in contemporary terrorism against such countries
as the United States and Britain.
The pejorative nature of terrorism may also pose practical challenges for
research since the scholar may require assistance from either specific groups that
are either vehemently opposed to being classified as terrorists or even being part
of a study of the phenomenon, or governmental sources that are insistent on such
a perspective. The scholarly goals of objectivity and honesty are of vital impor-
tance here but represent ideals to be strived toward rather than achieved, since
perfect objectivity is unattainable. The problem is exacerbated by the secret
nature of terrorism and counterterrorism. Many terrorist groups and most gov-
ernments provide substantial amounts of documentary evidence that the histori-
an can use. For example, terrorists routinely produce material, such as commu-
niqués, ideological statements, and training manuals. Such documents can be
subjected to the same intellectual and academic scrutiny that applies to any his-
torical source. However, to move beyond these documentary sources and the sec-
ondary literature, the scholar requires cooperation from those seeking to prevent
terrorism or those who are actively engaged in it or have been so recently.
Terrorism and counterterrorism is a struggle not only over violence but also over
legitimacy. Scholarly treatment offers a legitimizing force, especially for the ter-
rorist, so cooperation (and thus justification for a group’s actions) is often forth-
coming but it would be rash to assume that a scholar perceived as sympathetic
would not get more access to involved individuals than one perceived as unsym-
pathetic. Likewise, the scholar must approach governmental sources with equal
objectivity to avoid being misled or becoming simply a mouthpiece for govern-
ment policy. Both terrorists and counterterrorism forces — especially intelli-
gence and security services — operate to a large degree in secrecy, so the histo-
rian must honestly acknowledge at the outset the limits of their knowledge and
analysis.
The difficulties associated with objectively studying terrorism are real but
they should not be overstated. Good histories of both groups and the wider phe-
nomenon exist and the challenges should not be permitted to become impossi-
bilities. The extent of the problem faced by the historian in studying terrorism
might be unusual but the fact of it is not. Historians need simply to treat the sub-
ject as they do others but with an awareness of the frequently emotive and sub-
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jective nature of the topic. They will do what historians have always done. They
will start by trying to fill in the gaps in the record, for, notwithstanding the infor-
mation overload of the Internet Age, there will still be blank spaces and black
holes in the story. So, they will ask first: what is it that we still don’t know? To
answer that question, they will clamor for more documents and probe private
papers. They will seek out and interview — if possible — the players on both
sides. From these sources, they will identify and try to reconcile the differences
between the public record, the secret one, the private one, and recovered memo-
ry. Where they can’t be reconciled, the loose ends — the hangnails of history —
will be left for other historians to ponder. History is never finally wrapped up
neat and tidy. There always will be unanswered questions that will continue to
fascinate historians and absorb their readers.5
What they will be unable to control, however, is how others will use the
history they write. The Aum Shinrikyo case serves as an important reminder that
policy makers and scholars have to be careful how they use case studies and his-
tory to inform thinking about countering terrorism. The Aum case was widely
seen as a harbinger of future terrorism: a deadly and frightening combination of
mass casualty technologies and apocalyptic beliefs. In fact, thus far it has been
an ‘outlier’: a unique event. But, it is one that shaped US counterterrorism poli-
cy in misleading ways.  
The Aum was a Japanese cult with mixed motivations, encompassing polit-
ical, criminal, and religious elements, as well as some uniquely Japanese cultur-
al elements. Its leadership held an apocalyptic vision focused on surviving in a
post-Armageddon world. Shoko Asahara’s charismatic leadership was rigorous-
ly enforced. At its peak the movement had 40,000 members, mostly in Russia. It
had political aspirations; it contested the Diet elections in 1990 but failed badly.
Consequently, Aum turned toward political violence. It feared the threat from the
wider world, especially from the US, but Asahara’s need to reinforce his status
as a religious leader and other organizational factors played roles in Aum’s shift
toward terrorism and the specific timing of the March 1995 attack. However, the
immediate catalyst for its Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway on 20 March was
a police investigation of the cult. The attack was meant to disrupt the police
effort.6
Aum had been experimenting with chemical and biological agents for some
time and had carried out a series of unsuccessful attacks prior to the Tokyo inci-
dent. Its efforts failed for several reasons: idiosyncratic leadership choices;
rushed production; inability to get official help on key aspects of program; and
the fact that the cult relied on second-rate scientists. So, how did it come to be
seen as the harbinger of “the new terrorism”?
First, there was the unexpected nature of attack. Few had heard of Aum
before March 1995, and its use of Sarin gas challenged traditional assumptions
about terrorism: for example, that most cases involved low fatality incidents that
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were proportionate and instrumental in pursuit of limited strategic goals, such as
national self-determination. The history of terrorism with non-conventional
weapons had involved mostly small-scale acquisition, groups with more limited
goals, such as the Rajneshee cult using Salmonella or those who acquired dan-
gerous substances but did not actually use them.7 Aum was the first group with
the potential to acquire non-conventional weapons that demonstrated its willing-
ness to use them in an attempt to cause mass casualties. 
Second, Aum’s attack fitted the pattern of the time. Along with terrorism by
the radical right in the US (notably the Oklahoma City bombing, one month after
the Tokyo attack), attacks against US targets in Saudi Arabia, and the rise of
Palestinian suicide bus-bombings against Israel, Aum’s attack seemed to indicate
an evolution toward a “New Terrorism.” New motivations, such as religion, non-
traditional organizational structures, and an end to audience-driven proportional-
ity seemed to suggest that terrorism was becoming less predictable and more
lethal. The combination of Aum’s attack and the Oklahoma City bombing were
especially important in highlighting the threat within the US and the possibility
that terrorists might use weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Aum’s attack appeared to raise the bar by creating a new model for others
to follow. It was self-sufficient, had no state sponsorship, and engaged in multi-
track micro-proliferation. It was successful in promoting chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons as a means to gain attention. But
these concerns obscured the facts that Aum’s effort was not followed by a wave
of similar groups or attacks. Moreover, the few fatalities from Aum’s attack (12
in all) showed how hard it is to kill many with CBRN. But that lesson was imper-
fectly learned until years later; it was a source of academic and policy debate
through much of later 1990s.
Arising from that debate was a conflation of WMD and CBRN by both
American policy makers and scholars. Likewise, they shared the belief that
major future attacks on the US would involve CBRN weapons, not convention-
al weapons or their derivatives. This decision resulted in a massive effort to pre-
pare the US for CBRN attacks through the Domestic Preparedness Program
(DPP). Billions of dollars were spent to prepare cities, first responders, and mul-
tiple agencies and jurisdictions.8 This decision was partly understandable. As for-
mer White House Counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke explained: “[in
1996] we had no capability to deal with a CBW being used in the US.”9
Tim Naftali, author of Blind Spot (the history of US counter-terrorism
efforts written for the 9/11 Commission), suggests that the US focus on CBRN
weapons dating from Aum’s attack may have contributed to the “failure of imag-
ination” identified by the commission. The 1993 World Trade Center attack had
shown the vulnerability of major buildings. Post-Oklahoma City, some efforts
were made to identify vulnerable facilities, especially US installations overseas,
but it was a Herculean task due to the large number of potential targets, and the
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assumption remained that casualties would be in the hundreds, not thousands.
This assessment was reinforced by the attacks on US facilities in Saudi Arabia,
the 1998 African embassy bombings, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. The
US counterterrorism community did not rethink their strategic assumptions that
al-Qaeda was far from developing WMD, so would be unable to kill thousands
in the foreseeable future. The DPP was not primarily intended to be a response
to massive conventional weapons. Even the Millennium plots of December 1999
did little to overturn the conventional wisdom on the domestic threat.10
This “group think” was not unique to the policy community. It was also
reflected in the scholarly literature. Compared to the vast attention the group
would receive after 9/11 there were relatively few articles on al-Qaeda prior to
2001. However, there were many scholarly articles and even more media pieces
on WMD terrorism, all discussing CBRN weapons.11 Walter Laqueur argued that
“In retrospect, most terrorism experts did not pay sufficient attention to the bin
Laden conspiracy which, after all, had been many years in the making and affect-
ed many countries on all continents.”12 He attributed this failure to a variety of
causes, including a fixation on the impending use of WMD, driven by the Aum
case. As time passed and Aum’s attack was not replicated by other groups, some
of the tenets of the “new terrorism” debate (of which mass casualty attacks were
a part) were increasingly questioned. But massive conventional attacks simply
were not considered adequately.13 Moreover, much of the scholarly work on the
Aum misunderstood the case. Milton Leitenberg showed that, even after contra-
dictory evidence became available, for several years scholars continued to rely
on, and failed to challenge, key early studies of Aum’s attempts to acquire bio-
logical weapons, resulting in what he called “serial propagation of misinforma-
tion.”14 His point has wider relevance. As much of the evidence for terrorism is
difficult to acquire (always beforehand and often in retrospect), many of the
assessments in the literature are made on the basis of limited hard evidence and
may consequently be incorrect in detail and sometimes even in substance. Aum
was an important case in its own right but not as a model. Nor was it a seminal
event. 
How, then, will 9/11 be seen by historians? Was it the seminal event of our
age, as it appeared at the time, or a major terrorist incident but one, like the
Aum’s attack, that seems less historically or strategically significant in retrospect
than when it occurred? The ripple effects of 9/11 were felt around the globe in
real time and even now it is hard to escape the sense that this was a world-shak-
ing, world-shaping, watershed event, one that will forever mark a boundary
between the world we knew before 9/11 and the one we lived in after. David
Charters grapples with these issues in his article.15
It is unlikely that many of the basic facts will be in dispute. Thanks to
prolific and persistent journalists, dedicated scholars, a commission of inquiry,
and even the records left by the perpetrators and their mentors, we already have
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a pretty good chronology of events, from the creation of al-Qaeda, through the
planning stages and preparations, to the launching of the attacks. We know quite
a lot about the key actors. We also know a great deal about the sequence of events
that followed in the United States, among its allies, and in other countries
touched by the attacks: Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia, and central Asia. More
information enters the public domain daily and more will come in the decades
that follow as once-secret archives are opened, at least partly. Interviews with
participants, trial records, and memoirs will be added to the record. The future
historian of 9/11 will not suffer from a paucity of information but from a surfeit.
If they are true to form, future historians will debate endlessly, the “why”
questions. These, more than anything else, will be what sustains the process of
historical inquiry, what continues to breathe life into events long after their par-
ticipants and first-hand observers have passed on. Why did bin Laden decide to
declare war on the West? Was he outraged to the point of rebellion by the sta-
tioning of Western forces in his country? Or was it really all about the
Palestinians and the Israelis? Was it because his religious beliefs or his religious
mentors persuaded him that there was no other course? Was he truly offended by
what he saw as corruption in Saudi — and by extension — Muslim society? So,
was 9/11 really a battle in a larger struggle over the fate of Islam? Or was bin
Laden caught up in what Bruce Hoffman has called the cult of the insurgent?
What was the history he learned, what “lessons” did he take from it, and how did
he apply them? Was the Afghan War the Jihadists equivalent of the battle of
Karameh? Did he have an achievable end-state in mind and clear plan of how to
get from start to finish? Why were so many others, and yet — in the context of
the whole Muslim community —   also so few, inspired to follow his lead? What
motivated young Muslim men to abandon productive lives and sacrifice them-
selves for his cause?
Long after the 9/11 Commission report is gathering dust on library shelves,
historians will still ask, “How could this happen to the United States, the pre-
eminent superpower of its day?” Why did they fail to see the warning signs?
Why did they not act sooner? Was it solely an intelligence failure? A policy fail-
ure? A failure of “imagination” as the 9/11 Commission suggested? Was it a
“conspiracy” by dark forces with hidden agendas? Or was it simply gross incom-
petence — a symbol, symptom, and signal of the national malaise that inevitably
precedes and accompanies imperial decline? Historians will — quite rightly —
explore the impacts of American foreign policy in the region and its unintended,
unanticipated consequences. Will they conclude that America itself is to blame,
a victim of “blowback,” the author of its own fate? And in responding to the
attacks, did it walk into yet another “terrorist trap” with ‘eyes wide shut’? If so,
why?
All the while they will have to ask those questions in the context of what
was known and what was happening before the attacks occurred. Events don’t
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happen in isolation but are sketched upon a larger canvas already colored by
other events, personalities, trends, policies, and actions, a range of influences that
don’t always produce predictable or logical outcomes.16 And when they turn to
the question of 9/11’s significance, historians will have to tread more carefully,
for the clues here are often more subtle, all the more so for seeming obvious. 9/11
may indeed ultimately prove to be an artificial dividing line, but to prove or dis-
prove its legitimacy as a “turning point,” historians will have to ask: “What was
truly new and different after?” Thus they will need to look for continuities and
discontinuities.17
The Aum case suggests that we need to be wary of drawing lessons for
future acts of terrorism, especially if we try to base substantial analytical or pol-
icy changes on a single case. It also offers an excellent justification for taking a
long-term view of specific terrorist campaigns or incidents, and this is obvious-
ly the historian’s stock-in-trade. It is all too easy to reach rapid conclusions about
the significance of an incident: the imperative for a policy response is immedi-
ate, in order to protect lives and property; criminal cases may need to be con-
structed; much discussion will often be found in the media and, frequently, it is
scholars who are called upon to offer their expertise. All of this puts a priority on
a rapid judgment on the importance and wider significance of a group or incident
but is less effective in providing thoughtful analysis. Historical perspectives on
such events offer an important corrective to these inclinations and have the
advantage of temporal (and often some degree of emotional) distance from the
immediate situation. It is in providing such mature reflection that the historian’s
role in studying terrorism is paramount.
The Strategic Impact of Terrorist Campaigns 
Mark Sedgwick and David Rapoport, with their separate typologies but
united concept of “waves” of terrorism, suggest that a key strategic impact of
such violence is its ability to inspire other groups to adopt similar tactics. Bruce
Hoffman makes a similar point in this issue in his discussion of the ‘cult of the
guerrilla.’ Those who seek to emulate previous groups or campaigns probably do
not study them critically. They may be encouraged by the rare success rather than
being cautioned by the much larger record of failed or inconclusive campaigns.
As suggested in the Introduction, not all terrorist campaigns are equal in
terms of strategic impact. The impacts of the cases included in this issue break
down into three broad categories: global, regional, and minimal. The assassina-
tion of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Nazi terrorist campaign to weaken the
Weimar state, and al-Qaeda’s campaign and the American and allied response
clearly fit under the global category because their effects resonated on a scale
that affected and shaped the strategic policies, actions, and futures of major pow-
ers and had consequences that spanned the globe. The four national liberation
terrorist campaigns (Irish, Jewish, Algerian, and Palestinian) changed regional
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politics in a significant way. Since they have drawn in major powers, the Jewish
and Palestinian campaigns straddle the boundary between regional and global
impacts but their significance has been primarily regional. Finally, not every ter-
rorist campaign ends in victory. The French Rightists failed to take power in the
1930s, although their violence and threats contributed to the collapse of the gov-
ernment. Apart from refocusing attention on what has been called the 20th cen-
tury’s first genocide, Armenian terrorism’s strategic impact was practically nil.
The terrorist campaign of the Revolutionary Organization 17 November was
anachronistic, incoherent, and doomed to failure from its very inception. 
In fact, John Mueller argues that, by itself, sub-state terrorism rarely has
had a significant historical impact. He asserts that any historically significant
developments that emerge from terrorism generally derive not from the act itself
but from the reactions or overreactions of states and electorates to that act.18
This, of course, may be true but it begs a larger question: would those reactions
or overreactions have occurred without the galvanizing event? If not, then it may
be misleading to downplay the significance of the terrorist actions that prompt-
ed the response. 
But Mueller makes two exceptions to his own argument: assassinations
and cases where the targeted state has a low threshold of tolerance for sustaining
casualties. Not all assassinations are terrorist acts but a few that were part of ter-
rorist campaigns have had a notable strategic impact. For a terrorist assassination
to be historically significant, it must exert a major impact in a wider context. The
murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand is a case in point. As Keith Wilson
points out, the archduke’s assassins did not set out to ignite the First World War
but their actions created a crisis — and a pretext — that was exploited by the
Austrian government to impose policies they intended to carry out anyway, lead-
ing inexorably to a major conflagration that re-shaped Europe.19
If the terrorists’ target has a low tolerance for casualties, even relatively
small acts of terrorism can alter its policy. Zionist terrorism may have been influ-
ential in convincing the British to leave Palestine in 1947, although the asym-
metry of will between the two sides was an important element in the process. The
British government’s low tolerance for casualties occurred in a conflict it came
to regard as unimportant, especially given the war-weariness of the country and
in light of a reassessment of its strategic priorities once the Indian sub-continent
— the centerpiece of the empire — achieved independence.20
Equally, American forces sent to Lebanon in 1982 and Somalia in 1992
were engaging in peacekeeping missions that few Americans considered to be
worth very many lives. Thus, when terrorist bombs in the first case or a wild fire-
fight in the second took the lives of a significant number of those forces,
American attitudes and policy shifted and the troops were withdrawn. These two
examples are significant because they are frequently cited by bin Laden as proof
that because of their reluctance to tolerate casualties, the West and the United
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States in particular is vulnerable to defeat abroad by a dedicated campaign of ter-
rorism. Clearly, the inspirational value of such cases gives them heightened his-
torical significance.
Sometimes these reactions are self-defeating or even self-destructive acts
of counterterrorism that play into the hands of the terrorists, as was the case of
France in Algeria. States often overreact to terrorist events simply out of rage,
fear, or a desire to exact revenge; they lash out impetuously at the perceived
threat with little careful analysis, partly because it represents an immediate, emo-
tionally satisfying, and often popular action against those groups or individuals
that have attacked the state. However, the historical significance again arises
from the reaction, not from the terrorist act itself. In 1986, President Reagan
ordered the bombing of Libyan targets with planes launched from Britain. The
attacks were intended to “send a message” about Libyan sponsorship of terror-
ism and, more immediately, were a reprisal for the bombing of a Berlin dis-
cotheque that killed two people, one of them American. The short-term gain for
the United States was limited and the long-term impact was detrimental. Two
years later, Libyan agents participated in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over
Scotland (thus simultaneously targeting both the United States and Britain) that
killed 270, of whom 187 were Americans, and forced Pan Am into bankruptcy.21
Likewise, when al-Qaeda bombed two American embassies in Africa in 1998,
killing 224 people and injuring several thousand, President Clinton retaliated by
bombing some of bin Laden’s terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. This
caused the Afghan government, the Taliban, to reverse their previous undertak-
ings to extradite bin Laden to Saudi Arabia. Al-Qaeda became a magnet for funds
and recruits, and was cemented as the pre-eminent Islamic oppositional group to
US global hegemony. The Taliban moved from being reluctant hosts, fearing the
destabilizing impact al-Qaeda was having on their regime, to being allies and
partners.22
Similarly, the Indian government massively overreacted to Sikh terrorism
in 1984 by attacking the Sikh’s holiest place, the Golden Temple in Amritsar. The
attack on the temple killed the key Sikh fundamentalist leader, Bhindranwale,
along with hundreds of others. This resulted in an escalation in violence: the
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards, which in
turn resulted in the Delhi riots in which up to 4,000 Sikhs were killed in three
days. Furthermore, the 1985 destruction of an Air India plane in which 329 per-
sons perished, the largest death total caused by a terrorist attack until 9/11, can
also be seen as a direct result of the attack on the Golden Temple.
By the late 1980s, the Indian government had further stiffened its coun-
terinsurgency policies, and provided the police with new powers, better training,
and modern weapons. In this new situation, the police adopted a strategy of
searching out and confronting the leadership of insurgent groups and their sup-
porters. Police termed these confrontations as “encounters.” Quite frequently all
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of the insurgents ended up dead and their bodies were quickly cremated, while
the police did not appear to have suffered any casualties. One of those killed in
these circumstances was Talwinder Singh Parmar, the fundamentalist and charis-
matic head of the Babbar Khalsa in Canada and the prime suspect in the destruc-
tion of Air India flight 182.  However, contrary to other examples here, police
actions against Sikh “extremists” in India ultimately played an important role in
the decline of support for Khalistan, even if the shorter-term impact was a sub-
stantial escalation in the violence. Farson cites the figure of 11,694 people killed
in India by terrorists between 1981 and 1993 (of which 61 percent were Sikhs),
and some 20,000 by police in the late 1980s and early 1990s.23 Today, the
Khalistan movement is dormant.
Electorates also sometimes respond to terrorism in counter-productive
ways. Between 1996 and 2001, Palestinian militants apparently used terrorism
inside Israel to sabotage Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Israeli voters elected to
office parties and prime ministers (Likud leaders Benjamin Netanyahu and Ariel
Sharon, respectively) who, like the terrorists, were hostile to the negotiations.
The train bombings in Madrid, Spain, in March 2004 are thought to have been
significant because the attacks were almost immediately followed by the election
of a party committed to withdrawing Spanish troops from the war in Iraq.
However, the Aznar government was widely seen to have mishandled the imme-
diate aftermath of the attacks, blaming the Basque group, ETA, for the bombings.
It was more likely that the electorate was responding to this mismanagement than
to the terrorist attacks. Moreover, the incoming socialist government was fulfill-
ing an election pledge to withdraw Spain’s troops from Iraq made before the
attacks occurred. However, it may be equally significant that al-Qaeda had ana-
lyzed the political situation in Spain and concluded that support for the war was
weak and that the government was vulnerable to pressure by violence. Whatever
the reason, the consequence was a victory for the terrorists.24
Another common reaction to terrorism is to become overly protective
and to overspend on security. Sometimes, target countries can become so fearful
and self-protective that significant consequences, particularly economic ones,
ensue. The costs of reaction to 9/11 in the United States outweigh those imposed
by the attacks, which were by far the most destructive in history. The direct eco-
nomic losses of 9/11 amounted to tens of billions of dollars but the economic
costs in the United States of the enhanced security runs several times that and the
consequent disruption escalated the cost: Robert Congleton argued that the effec-
tive need for people to spend an additional half-hour in airports cost the
American economy US$15 billion per year.25 The reaction to the anthrax attacks
cost the United States Post Office alone some five billion dollars: one billion for
every fatality inflicted by the terrorist.26
In addition, there have been substantial opportunity costs: the enormous
sums of money being spent to deal with the threat of terrorism have in part been
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diverted from other activities. Not all money spent on countering terrorism is
without wider benefits. However, the money does come from other programs that
are important yet consequently underfunded. Unquestionably, severe funding
distortions have occurred, even within agencies: almost 75 percent of the appro-
priations for first responders went for terrorism rather than for natural disasters,
and US$2 billion was made available in grants to improve preparedness for ter-
rorism but only US$180 million for natural disasters, such as Hurricane
Katrina.27 In the 1990s, a similar effect could be seen in the funding directed
toward first responders’ ability to cope with incidents involving chemical, bio-
logical, radiological, or nuclear materials in the United States. Arguably, this
came at the expense of preparedness for a range of other types of incidents.
If the war in Iraq is seen as part of the War on Terrorism, then the reaction
to 9/11 also has claimed more human lives than were lost in the terrorist attacks.
The number of Americans, military and civilian contractors employed by the
Department of Defense, who have died thus far in the conflict in Iraq exceeds the
number killed on September 11. More than 20,000 have been wounded. This
excludes those killed or wounded in Afghanistan and all those working for other
departments and agencies, or, obviously, for other countries.28 Moreover, the war
in Iraq probably resulted in the deaths of 100,000 Iraqis during its first 18 months
alone.29 This could represent more fatalities than were inflicted by all sub-state
terrorism, domestic and international, over the last century.
Although it is impossible to prevent every terrorist act, robust states, espe-
cially democracies, are not “vulnerable” in the sense that they can be toppled by
dramatic acts of terrorist destruction, even extreme ones. This is a lesson that
could have been learned from the example of the Anarchists in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Although they succeeded in killing an impressive
array of heads of state and leaders of government, and in spite of being armed
with a newly destructive weapon, dynamite, that contemporaries believed would
bring societies to collapse, the Anarchists were unable to exact meaningful
change. Societal and civic structures were more effective at surviving bombings
than physical structures or political leaders. Terrorism can bring about major,
possibly even strategic changes that would be of great historic significance, but
short of a cataclysmic event it would be the responders, not the terrorists, who
would bring it about. Ultimately, the enemy, it appears, is us. Terrorists very
often hope for, indeed rely upon, overreaction by their foes. This goal of spark-
ing an overreaction seems central to bin Laden’s strategy, as to that of many other
terrorists. Bin Laden seeks to bleed “America to the point of bankruptcy,” and
depends upon inadvertent cooperation from his target, noting that the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks cost al-Qaeda US$500,000 while the attack and its aftermath
inflicted, he claims, a cost of more than US$500 billion on the United States.30
In spite of the apparent political imperative that public officials “do some-
thing” to respond to acts of terrorism, leaders can restrain their instinct to over-
Conclusion  4/19/09  11:06 PM  Page 199
Winter 2007
200
react and such a limited reaction is politically feasible. In contrast to the Reagan
administration’s reaction to Libya two years before, in response to the bombing
of Pan Am 103, the Bush and Clinton administrations sought compensation for
the victims and applied police, diplomatic, and intelligence efforts to prosecute
those responsible. This approach took years to yield results but was politically
acceptable. Thus, despite short-term demands that some sort of action must be
taken, politicians can often successfully ride out this demand after the obligato-
ry expressions of outrage are prominently and promptly issued.
It is worth noting, however, that under-reaction, though less common, can
also be a problem.  The sabotage of Air India flight 182 on 23 June 1985 using
an improvised explosive device (IED) constituted the most deadly mass murder
in Canadian history, claiming 329 victims, the vast majority of whom were
Canadian citizens of Indian extraction. It could have served as a watershed event
for Canadian counterterrorism but it did not. The inability to obtain convictions
after a prolonged investigation represents a multi-leveled failure of government,
police, and intelligence. This is no less the case than if the government had over-
reacted, since proportionality is critical in both an assessment of terrorism’s
strategic impact and in the correct response to a terrorist campaign.31
This brings the discussion back to the role of history in the study of terror-
ism. Objective, scholarly analysis is not only possible but is inherently valuable
in its own right for its own purpose: the dissemination of knowledge. But it is
equally important from a policy perspective, in order to see the world through the
terrorists’ eyes, to more fully understand a campaign and thus to avoid doing the
very things that will help them achieve their objectives. 
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